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Verifiable Public Key Encryption Scheme with
Equality Test in 5G Networks
Yan Xu, Ming Wang, Hong Zhong*, Jie Cui, Lu Liu, and Virginia N.L. Franqueira
Abstract—The emergence of 5G networks will allow Cloud
Computing providers to offer more convenient services. However,
security and privacy issues of cloud services in 5G networks rep-
resent huge challenges. Recently, to improve security and privacy,
a novel primitive was proposed by Ma et al. in TIFS 2015, called
Public Key Encryption with Equality Test supporting Flexible
Authorization (PKEET-FA). However, the PKEET scheme lacks
verification for equality test results to check whether the cloud
performed honestly. In this research, we expand the study of
PKEET-FA and propose a verifiable PKEET scheme, called V-
PKEET, which, to the best of our knowledge, is the first work that
achieves verification in PKEET. Moreover, V-PKEET has been
designed for three types of authorization to dynamically protect
the privacy of data owners. Therefore, it further strengthens
security and privacy in 5G networks.
Index Terms—Public key encryption, equality test, privacy-
preserving, verification, Cloud Computing, 5G networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
EMPOWERED by new Radio Access Technologies (RAT-s), 5G wireless access solutions are designed to support
a variety of applications. This will enable a significant growth
in mobile use of cloud-based services, and an upwards trend
in outsourcing of privacy sensitive data to cloud servers.
5G networks exacerbate the privacy problems intrinsic to
Cloud Computing. For example, cloud storage can reduce
the client storage burden but, in order to prevent the cloud
from modifying the stored data, its integrity should always
be verifiable [1] [2]. For the purpose of security and privacy-
preservation, this data also needs to be encrypted before it is
stored in cloud servers. For this reason, a large number of
researchers have lately concentrated in supporting operations
on encrypted data, such as, searchable encryption [3] [4] [5]
and outsourced computing [6] [7]. In this paper, we focus
on public key encryption with equality test (PKEET), which
was firstly proposed by Yang et al. in CT-RSA 2010 [8].
PKEET is used to test whether two messages encrypted by
using (possibly) two different public keys are identical. In such
application of PKEET scheme as outsourced database, once
receiving the trapdoors from users, the database manager can
then partition the database in accordance with the encrypted
messages without the need to interact with data users. PKEET
has also various applications in Cloud Computing. For ex-
ample, the property of equality test can be used to search
ciphertexts and classify encrypted messages.
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The paper uses as example an email system able to classify
all emails by encrypted keywords generated by an email
security monitor. Therefore, the monitor is in charge of
producing encrypted sensitive keywords, and the cloud email
server uses PKEET to search if such sensitive keywords
are involved in the mails or not, without knowledge of the
emails content. Suppose that Alice encrypts emails using her
public key pkA, encryption will conceal content, and prevent
some crucial information from being searched. To increase
search precision, the encrypted emails are attached to a small
number of keywords encrypted in PKEET system, and a single
ciphertext expressed as C=Enc(M;pkA)jjPKEET(W1; pkA)jj
PKEET(W2; pkA)jj:::jjPKEET(Wn; pkA). Finally, Alice trans-
fers the cipertext C to the cloud email server for further
classification. The key point of the PKEET scheme is that the
cloud email server can check if the encrypted keywords are
attached to an email including some given keywords generated
by the email security monitor.
However, Yang et al. [8] showed that anyone has the ability
to test if two ciphertexts are encrypted under the same plaintext
without any authorization. In other words, the attacker can
choose an user as target and generate a ciphertext using its
public key, however, due to the function of equality test so
that the attacker can guess the plaintext under the ciphertext.
Therefore, it is essential to implement an authorization strategy
to protect data owners privacy. Only after the users send
delegations to the cloud, can the cloud provider perform the
equality test. Furthermore, different applications demand dif-
ferent delegation strategies to dynamically protect the privacy
of data owners. Recently, Ma et al. [9] designed a PKEET-FA
scheme without verification for equality test results. However,
in practice, the cloud may be malicious and, therefore, may
compute and deliver to users a wrong result. Furthermore, the
PKEET-FA scheme supports four scenarios S1-S4 with differ-
ent delegation granularity levels. There are, however, two other
scenarios S5-S6 with different levels of delegation which are
not supported. One is receiver-specific level authorization(S5),
i.e. all ciphertexts of Alice can only make a comparison with
all ciphertexts of a specific receiver (e.g. Bob), but could not
make a comparison with any ciphertext of anyone other than
Bob. The other one is receiver-specific ciphertext-to-reveiver
level authorization(S6), i.e a specific ciphertext of Alice could
only make a comparison with all ciphertexts of a specific
receiver such as Bob, but could not make a comparison with
any ciphertext of any receiver other than Bob.
S5. Assume that the receiver (Alice) and the email security
monitor work in the same company. By obtaining the delega-
tions from Alice and the email security monitor, respectively,
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the cloud email server has the ability to test whether the
emails encrypted by Alices public key include the keywords
encrypted under the email security monitors public key. The
key is that Alice intends to affirm that the equality test is
surely performed on her ciphertexts and the specified monitors
ciphertexts (see Fig.1(a)). In other words, Alice and a specific
entity produce a trapdoor each to perform equality test in
regard to all their ciphertexts.
S6. Assume that the email security monitor belongs to a
public institution, different than the company where Alice
works, and the institution works in a pay-per-keyword manner.
The cloud email server only has the ability to test whether the
specific email encrypted by Alices public key is contained in
keywords encrypted under the specific monitors public key
(see Fig.1(b)). In other words, Alice produces a trapdoor to
perform the equality test on her specific ciphertext while the
monitor produces a trapdoor to perform the equality test on
all of its ciphertexts.
A. Our Contribution
The proposed scheme supports three types of authoriza-
tion(See Fig.2) simultaneously, which are described in detail
in the following. Type-1 authorization is the same as that in
[9], however, in our construction, this type is more efficient.
Type-2 authorization requires no proxies other than that in
FG-PKEET [10] and FG-PKEET+ [11]. Type-3 authorization
is novel and has not been implemented in earlier works.
1) Type-1
Receiver level authorization: All ciphertexts of Alice
(receiver) can make a comparison with all ciphertexts of
any other receiver. (This type represents a coarse-grained
delegation.)
2) Type-2
Receiver-specific level authorization:All ciphertexts of
Alice can only make a comparison with all ciphertexts
of a specific receiver (e.g. Bob). However, it could not
make a comparison with ciphertext of anyone other than
Bob. (This type represents a fine-grained delegation)
3) Type-3
Receiver-specific ciphertext-to-receiver level autho-
rization(or receiver-specific receiver-to-ciphertext level
authorization): A specific ciphertext of Alice could only
make a comparison with all ciphertexts of a specific
receiver. such as Bob. However, it could not make a
comparison with any ciphertext of any receiver other
than Bob (or vice versa).
Furthermore, we propose the concept of enhanced PKEET,
called verifiable PKEET (V-PKEET). It supports verification
of results from an untrusted cloud server, in other words, we
consider the cloud is malicious, i.e., that could compute a
wrong result to users. In our system, the user checks whether
the cloud server has devotedly performed the authorized e-
quality test, which, to the best of our knowledge, has not been
researched previously. Finally, the proposed scheme completes
a satisfying security.
B. Related Works
1) Public Key Encryption with Keyword Search(PEKS):
The primitive of public key encryption with keyword search
was originally introduced by Boneh et al. [12]. In this re-
search, a sender encrypts plaintexts using the receivers public
key enabling the receiver to search over the ciphertexts in
the asymmetric encryption system. The receiver generates
a tag to check if the keyword embedded in the token is
equal to the message underlying the ciphertext. Bellare et
al. [13] showed an efficient searchable scheme based on
a deterministic encryption algorithm to effectively complete
retrieval of encrypted data. Boneh and Waters [14] presented
a new searchable public key encryption(PKE) scheme which
provided the functions of comparison search, ordinary subset
search and connectives search. Later Curtmola et al. [15]
proposed a secure searchable scheme, called dPEKS, which
enhanced the security model of PEKS by taking advantage of
a servers public key in the encryption process. Before long,
Yau et al. [16] used the technique of proxy re-encryption to
achieve bidirectional Re-dPEKS and Guo et al. [17] enhanced
the scheme to be more efficient. These PKE schemes could
produce a token associated with the keyword, and one would
be capable of classifying the ciphertexts in accordance with
the plaintexts, taking advantage of the token. Nevertheless, this
approach has a weakness: a same message encrypted using
different public keys cannot be divided into one category. To
address this problem, we concentrate on studying PKEET.
2) Public Key Encryption with Equality Test (PKEET): The
concept of public key encryption with equality test (PKEET)
was firstly introduced by Yang et al. [8]. The study offers a
new function to test whether two ciphertexts that could be
generated under different public keys are the same plaintext.
However, the scheme has no delegation mechanism for data
owners to assign someone to test. To realize authorization on
PKEET, Tang [10] proposed a novel scheme which provided
fine-grained authorization strategy (FG-PKEET) for users.
However, in this scheme, the two users need to interact to pro-
duce a random value. Besides, Tang [18] came up with a new
primitive, called AoN-PKEET, to complete a coarse-grained
delegation. Furthermore, Tang [11] applied FG-PKEET to a
two-proxy system in which two agent servers needed to work
together to achieve an equality test (FG-PKEET+). However,
the proposal requires a protocol to interact between two agent
servers, and this is too costly. In this paper, we improve the
FG-PKEET+ and present the Type-2 authorization, where a
proxy server is not required to participate such that it can
reduce the communication cost. Huang et al. [19] introduced a
new proposal, called PKE-AET, which can achieve the equality
test between authorized ciphertexts and users through war-
rants. Lee et al. [20] identified a serious flaw and modified the
PKE-AET so as to achieve the IND-CCA2 secure. Recently,
Ma et al. [9] has proposed a scheme that supports various
levels of authorizations simultaneously, called PKEET-FA. All
the above-mentioned approaches lack verification for the result
of equality test. This means that receivers cannot confirm
whether the cloud server has faithfully performed the protocol.
However, if a malicious cloud server deceives the user for
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Fig. 1. Application scenarios for V-PKEET.
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Fig. 2. Three types of authorizations of V-PKEET.(1) Receiver level authorization (S1);(2) Receiver-specific level authorization (S5);(3) Receiver-specific
ciphertext-to-reveiver (S6).
the purpose of self-interest, the equality test is meaningless.
To innovate it, it is imperative to verify the return result of
equality test from the malicious cloud.
3) Verifiable Computation: Verifiable computation plays a
particularly important role in outsourced computing, especially
in a malicious cloud environment. Generally speaking, verifi-
able computation protocols [21] [22] [23] [24] enable a client
with weak computation ability to outsource the processed data
to the cloud. The cloud then returns corresponding results,
as well as proofs that the data has been processed correctly.
Gennaro et al. proposed the concept of non-interactive ver-
ifiable computation in CRYPTO 2010 [21]. In this case, the
client can verify the outsourced result through a proof. Shortly
afterwards, Benabbas et al. [22] conceived the first practical
verifiable computation scheme for large datasets. In [23],
Fiore and Gennaro made use of a pseudo-random function
with closed-form efficiency and designed two novel construc-
tions for publicly verification: one was evaluation of large
polynomials and another was matrix multiplication. Parno et
al. [24] combined the concepts of verifiable calculation and
attributed-based encryption to complete public delegation and
public verification. Recently, Zheng et al. [25] presented a
verifiable authorized set intersection scheme over ciphertexts.
They expanded the single-accumulator scheme [26] [27] to test
whether members belong to the set. In our paper, we consider
the malicious cloud may compute the inaccurate result to
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users and use variant of the technique in [25] to verify its
authenticity.
C. Organization
In the next part of the paper, we introduce the preliminaries.
Then we give the system model and introduce its formal
definition and threat models in Section 3. Furthermore, a
construction of V-PKEET is presented in Section 4, and
security analyses are showed in the next part. Section 6
presents performance analyses. Finally, we conclude this paper
in Section 7.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Bilinear Map
Let G, G1 and GT be three cyclic groups of prime order
p. We denote that g and g1 are generators of G and G1,
respectively. A bilinear map e : G  G1  ! GT owns the
following properties:
1) Bilinear: For any S 2 G and T 2 G1 and u; v 2
Zp; e(S
u; T v) = e(S; T )uv:
2) Non-degenerate: e(S; T ) 6= 1 .
3) Computable: There is an efficient algorithm to compute
e(S; T ) for any S 2 G and T 2 G1.
B. Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) Assumption
Given fg; ga; gbg, where g is the generator of G with prime
order p and a; b 2 Zp . It is intractable to calculate gab.
C. Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) Assumption
Given fga; gb; gcg, where g is the generator of G with
prime order p and a; b; c 2 Zp. It is intractable to distinguish
fga; gb; gabg from fga; gb; gcg.
Cloud Server
Alice Bob
proof
proofpublic 
parameter
(pkB,skB)(pkA,skA)
Trusted Authority
Test
Fig. 3. System Model of V-PKEET.
III. DEFINITION OF V-PKEET
A. System Model
In our system (see Fig.3), there are several entities involved:
trusted authority (TA), data owners described as Alice and
Bob, cloud server (CS).
1) Trusted Authority (TA). The TA is in charge of gener-
ating system public parameters that will be used by the
CS and data owners, and of generating public/private
key pairs for data owners
2) Data Owners. Alice and Bob use their respective public
key to encrypt their private data, called MA and MB ,
then outsource the resulting ciphertexts denoted by CA
and CB to the CS. At any point in time when the data
owner intends to authorize the equality test, he (or she)
will generate a trapdoor to delegate the CS to perform
the test.
3) Cloud Server (CS). The CS stores the resulting ci-
phertexts, and performs the equality test algorithm but
without decrypting ciphertexts. After the cloud has per-
formed the equality test, it returns a proof to Alice (or
Bob) which is used to verify the validity of the result.
B. Definition of V-PKEET
Definition 1. A V-PKEET cryptosystem has the following
algorithms:
1) Setup(): It inputs a security parameter , and generates
a public parameter pp as output.
2) KeyGen(pp): It inputs the public parameter pp, and
generates a public/secret key pair(pki; ski) for receiver
Ui as output.
3) Enc(Mi; pki): It inputs a message Mi and the public
key pki of receiver Ui, and generates a ciphertext C as
output.
4) Dec(Ci; ski): It inputs a ciphertext Ci and the secret key
ski of receiver Ui, and returns a plaintext Mi as output.
In order to complete Type ( = 1; 2; 3) delegation for Ui
and Uj , we give the definitions of Aut( = 1; 2; 3) algorithm
to compute trapdoors for U 0is=U
0
js ciphextext (or ciphertexts),
and Test( = 1; 2; 3) algorithm to test if the two ciphertexts
are encrypted under the identical plaintext.
Type-1 Authorization:
Type-1-1 Aut1(ski): This algorithm inputs the secret key
ski, and calculates a trapdoor td(1;i) for Ui as output.
Type-1-2 Auxiliary1(Mi; pkj): This algorithm uses U 0is
message Mi and U 0js public key as inputs and produces some
auxiliary information Digi and aui as output, then gives aui
to the cloud.
Type-1-3 Test1(Ci; td(1;i); aui; Cj ; td(1;j); auj): This algo-
rithm inputs U 0is ciphertext Ci, the trapdoor td(1;i) , the
auxiliary information aui, U 0js ciphertext Cj , the trapdoor
td(1;j) and the auxiliary information auj , and outputs 1 if Ci
and Cj are encrypted under the same plaintext and 0 otherwise.
After that the cloud calculates a proof for Ui(or Uj) and returns
it to Ui(or Uj) which can verify if the cloud has devotedly
executed the protocol.
Type-2 Authorization:
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Type-2-1 Aut2(ski; pkj): This algorithm inputs U 0is secret
key ski and U 0js public key pkj , and calculates a trapdoor
td(2;i;j) for (Ui; Uj) as output.
Type-2-2 Auxiliary2(Mi; pkj): This algorithm uses U 0is
message Mi and U 0js public key pkj as inputs, and produces
some auxiliary information Digi and aui as output, then gives
aui to cloud.
Type-2-3 Test2(Ci; td(2;i;j); aui; Cj ; td(2;j;i); auj): It in-
puts U 0is ciphertext Ci, the trapdoor td(2;i;j) , the auxiliary
information aui, U 0js ciphertext Cj , the trapdoor td(2;j;i) and
the auxiliary information auj , and outputs 1 if Ci and Cj
are encrypted under the same plaintext and 0 otherwise. After
that the cloud calculates a proof for Ui(or Uj) and returns it to
Ui(or Uj) which can verify if the cloud has devotedly executed
the protocol.
Type-3 Authorization:
Type-3-1(1) Aut(3;i)(ski; Ci; pkj): This algorithm inputs
U 0is secret key ski, its ciphertext Ci and U
0
js public key pkj ,
and computes a trapdoor td(3;i;Ci;j) for (Ui; Ci; Uj) as output.
Type-3-1(2) Aut(3;j)(skj ; pki): This algorithm inputs U 0js
secret key skj , U 0is public key pki, and calculates a trapdoor
td(3;j;i) for (Uj ; Ui) as output.
Type-3-2(1) Auxiliary(3;i)(Mi; pkj): This algorithm inputs
U 0is message Mi and U
0
js public key pkj , and produces some
auxiliary information Digi and aui as output, and gives aui
to cloud.
Type-3-2(2) Auxiliary(3;j)(Mj ; pki): This algorithm inputs
U 0js message Mj and U
0
is public key pki, and produces some
auxiliary information Digj and auj as output, and gives auj
to cloud.
Type-3-3 Test3(Ci; td(3;i;Ci;j); aui; Cj ; td(3;j;i); auj): It
uses U 0is ciphertext Ci, the trapdoor td(3;i;Ci;j), the auxiliary
information aui, U 0js ciphertext Cj the trapdoor td(3;j;i) and
the auxiliary information auj as inputs, and outputs 1 if Ci
and Cj are encrypted under the same plaintext or 0 otherwise.
At the same time, the cloud returns a proof to Ui(or Uj) which
can verify if the cloud has devotedly executed the protocol.
5) Prove: The cloud server generates a proof which al-
lows verification whether it has faithfully performed the
protocol. If Ci and Cj are encrypted under the same
plaintext, the cloud server executes Prove1, or else
the cloud server executes Prove2. In Prove1=Prove2,
H(Ti) is generated in Test algorithm as U 0is ciphertext
conversion section.
(1)Prove1(H(Ti);H(Tj)): This algorithm inputs
H(Ti);H(Tj), and outputs a proof to Ui(or Uj).
(2)Prove2(H(Ti);H(Tj)): This algorithm inputs
H(Ti) and H(Tj), and outputs a proof sends to Ui(or
Uj).
6) Verify(ski; Digi; rslti; proofi): This algorithm inputs
U 0is secret key ski, digest Digi, result rslti, and the
proof proofi, and outputs 1 if the cloud has faithfully
executed the protocol and 0 otherwise.
C. Security Models
In this paper, we consider two types of adversaries for the
security model of the V-PKEET scheme:
1)Type-I adversary: For Type ( = 1; 2; 3) authorization,
the adversary owns Type  trapdoor and is looking forward
to disclose the message under the challenge ciphertext.
2)Type-II adversary: For Type ( = 1; 2; 3) authorization,
the adversary does not obtain Type  trapdoor and is looking
forward to tell apart that Ct is the encrypted value of which
plaintext.
In the following, we give the definition of OW-CCA secu-
rity for Type   ( = 1; 2; 3) authorization against Type-I
adversary in V-PKEET.
Game 1: Let A1 is a Type-I adversary and the underlying
receivers with the subscript k(1  k  n). The game between
the adversary A1 and the challenger C is described as below:
1) Setup: C first executes the Setup algorithm and gives
A1 the outcoming public parameter pp. Then C exe-
cutes KeyGen to produce n pairs of public/secret keys
(pki; ski)(1  i  n) and gives all pki to A1.
2) Phase1: the adversary A1 is permitted to ask all sorts of
queries for a polynomial number of times, as follows.
The restriction is that < t > does not appear in the key
retrieve queries.
 Key retrieve queries < i >: C returns ski to the
adversary A1.
 Decryption queries < i;Ci >: C executes Dec
algorithm on input (Ci; ski) to decrypt Ci using
ski and returns the output to the adversary A1.
 Authorization queries: For Type   ( = 1; 2; 3)
authorization,
–when inputs < i >, C returns td(1;i);
–when inputs < i; j >, C returns td(2;i;j);
–when inputs < i;Ci; j >, C returns td(3;i;Ci;j).
3) Challenge: C selects a random message Mt 2 M ,
executes Ct = Enc(Mt; pkt) and sends C

t to the
adversary A1 as the challenge ciphextext.
4) Phase 2: A1 requests the same as the queries in Phase
1. The restrictions are that
 < t > is not used as an input of the key retrieve
queries;
 < t;Ct > is not used as an input of the decryption
queries.
5) Guess: A1 returns M
0
t 2M . In the game, when M
0
t =
Mt; A1 is the winner. The probability that A1 is the
winner is denoted by
AdvOW CCA;Type V PKEET;A1 () = Pr[Mt = M
0
t ]( = 1; 2; 3)
(1)
Definition 2: We say that the V-PKEET is OW-CCA secure for
Type ( = 1; 2; 3) authorization if for any PPT adversaries
A1, its advantageAdv
OW CCA;Type 
V PKEET;A1 () is negligible in the
security parameter.
Now we give the definition of the IND-CCA security for the
Type  ( = 1; 2; 3) authorization against Type-II adversary
in V-PKEET below.
Game 2: Let A2 is a Type-II adversary and the underlying
receiver with the subscript k(1  k  n). The game between
the adversary A2 and the challenger C is described next.
1) Setup: C first executes the Setup algorithm and gives
A2 the outcoming public parameter pp. Then C exe-
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cutes KeyGen to produce n pairs of public/secret keys
(pki; ski)(1  i  n) and gives all pki to A2.
2) Phase1: A2 requests the same as the queries in Game
1.
3) Challenge: A2 submits two plaintexts M0;M1 2 M
of same length. C randomly selects a bit b 2 f0; 1g,
executes and returns Ct = Enc(Mb; pkt) to the A2 as
the challenge ciphextext and returns Ct to the A2 as the
challenge ciphextext.
4) Phase 2: A2 requests the same as the queries in Phase
1. The restrictions are that
 < t > is not used as an input in the key retrieve
queries.
 < t;Ct > is not used as an input in the decryption
queries.
 For Type  ( = 1; 2; 3) authorization queries,
– = 1 :< t >is not used as an input in the
authorization queries;
– = 2 :< t;Ct > is not used as an input in the
authorization queries;
– = 3 :< t;Ct ; ; > is not used as an input in the
authorization queries.
5) Guess: A2 returns b0 2 f0; 1g. In this game, when
b = b0, A2 is the winner. The probability that A2 is
the winner is denoted by
AdvIND CCA;Type V PKEET;A2 ()
= jPr[b = b0]  1
2
( = 1; 2; 3)
(2)
Definition 3: We say that the V-PKEET is IND-CCA secure
for Type   ( = 1; 2; 3) authorization if for any PPT
adversaries A2, its advantage Adv
IND CCA;Type 
V PKEET;A2 () is
negligible in the security parameter .
IV. OUR V-PKEET SCHEME
Now we present an effective V-PKEET scheme.
1) Setup(): It inputs a security parameter  and re-
turns the public parameters pp. Firstly, the algorith-
m constructs a bilinear map, where the G;G1, and
GT are three groups with prime order p and g; g1
are the generators of G;G1 respectively and random-
ly chooses  2 Zp and calculates g; g1 . Then
it selects four cryptographic hash functions: H :
GT ! Zp; H1 : f0; 1g ! f0; 1gl;H2 : G1 !
f0; 1gl1+l2 ;H3 : G ! G, where l1 and l2 represent
lengths of element of G and Zp , respectively. pp =
fp; e;G;G1; GT ; g; g1; g; g1 ;H;H1;H2;H3g.
2) KeyGen(pp): It inputs pp and randomly chooses
xi; yi 2 Zp , then outputs the key pair for receiver Ui:
(pki; ski) = ((Xi = g
xi
1 ; Yi = g
yi); (xi; yi))
3) Enc(Mi; pki): It inputs U 0is plaintext Mi and public
key pki and randomly selects ri;1; ri;2 2 Zp , then
generates a ciphertext Ci = (Ci;1; Ci;2; Ci;3; Ci;4; Ci;5)
as following:
Ci;1 = g
ri;1
1 ; Ci;2 = g
ri;2
Ci;3 = H2(X
ri;1
i ) (Mijjri;1)
Ci;4 = Y
ri;2
i H3(Mi)
Ci;5 = H1(Ci;1jjCi;2jjCi;3jjCi;4jjMijjri;1)
4) Dec(Ci; ski): It inputs a ciphertext Ci =
(Ci;1;Ci;2; Ci;3; Ci;4; Ci;5) and private key ski,
then computes Mijjri;1. If Ci;1 = gri;11 and
Ci;5 = H1(Ci;1jjCi;2jjCi;3jjCi;4jjMijjri;1) both
hold, it returns Mi; otherwise, it returns an error
indicator ?.
Type-1 Authorization:
Type-1-1 Aut1(ski): The algorithm returns a trapdoor
td(1;i) = yi.
Type-1-2 Auxiliary1(Mi; pkj): Ui generates auxiliary in-
formation aui = (cphi; i) for each message of Ui. Firstly,
Ui computes H(e(H3(Mi); g1)) for each message of Ui
and Digi = gH(e(H3(Mi);g1))+ for verification. Then Ui
transforms Digi to cphi using U 0js public key pkj , cphi =
(gwi;1 ; gwi;2 ; DigiY
(wi;1+wi;2)
j ), where wi;1; wi;2  Zp. Fi-
nally, Ui signs cphi and gets i  sigSign(sigSk; cpki)to
prevent the cloud from tampering cphi which could bring a
wrong ciphertext. Similarly, Uj can run the same algorithm
to generate a trapdoor and auxiliary information auj =
(cphj ; j).
Type-1-3 Test1(Ci; td(1;i); aui; Cj ; td(1;j); auj): Firstly, it
calculates
Ci;4=C
yi
i;2 = H3(Mi)
Cj;4=C
yj
j;2 = H3(Mj)
If H3(Mi) = H3(Mj) holds set Ti = e(H3(Mi); g1),
Tj = e(H3(Mj); g1) return 1 and then run
Prove1(H(Ti);H(Tj)) ! proofi for Ui, or return 0
and run Prove2(H(Ti);H(Tj)) ! proofi for Ui otherwise.
(Similarly, the cloud can generate proofj for Uj)
Type-2 Authorization:
Type-2-1 Aut2(ski; pkj): The algorithm returns a trapdoor
td(2;i;j) = (X
xi
j ; X
xiyi
j ) .
Type-2-2 Auxiliary2(Mi; pkj): Ui computes
H(e(H3(Mi); X
xi
j )) for each message of Ui and lets
Digi = g
H(e(H3(Mi);X
xi
j ))+ for verification. Then
Ui transforms Digi to cphi using U 0js public key
pkj , cphi = (gwi;1 ; gwi;2 ; DigiY
(wi;1+wi;2)
j ) , where
wi;1; wi;2  Zp. Finally, Ui runs i  sigSign(sigSk; cphi)
to obtain a signature i on ciphertext cphi. Ui generates
auxiliary information aui = (cphi; i) for each message of
Ui. Similarly, Uj can run the same algorithm to generate a
trapdoor td(2;j;i) = (X
xj
i ; X
xjyj
i ) and auxiliary information
auj = (cphj ; j).
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Type-2-3 Test2(Ci; td(2;i;j); aui; Cj ; td(2;j;i); auj): The al-
gorithm calculates
Ti =
e(Ci;4; X
xi
j )
e(Ci;2; X
xiyi)
j
= e(H3(Mi); g1)
xixj
Tj =
e(Cj;4; X
xj
i )
e(Cj;2; X
xjyj)
i
= e(H3(Mj); g1)
xixj
If Ti = Tj holds, return 1 and run
Prove1(H(Ti); H(Tj)) ! proofi for Ui, or return 0
and run Prove2(H(Ti);H(Tj)) ! proofi for Ui otherwise.
(Similarly, the cloud can generate proofj for Uj)
Type-3 Authorization:
Type-3-1(1) Aut(3;i)(ski; Ci; pkj): The algorithm calculates
a trapdoor td(3;i;Ci;j) = (C
yi
i;2Y
yi
j ; X
xi
j ; X
xiyi
j ).
Type-3-1(2) Aut(3;j)(skj ; pki): The algorithm calculates a
trapdoor td(3;j;i) = (X
xj
i ; X
xjyj
i ).
Type-3-2(1) Auxiliary(3;i)(Mi; pkj): Ui computes  =
e(H3(Mi); X
xi
j ) for message of specific Ci and let-
s Digi = gH()+ for verification. Then Ui transform-
s Digi to cphi using U 0js public key pkj , cphi =
(gwi;1 ; gwi;2 ; DigiY
(wi;1+wi;2)
j ), where wi;1; wi;2  Zp. Fi-
nally, Ui runs i  sigSign(sigSk; cpki)to obtain a signature
i on ciphertext cphi. Ui generates auxiliary information
aui = (cphi; i) for the message of specific Ci.
Type-3-2(2) Auxiliary(3;j)(Mj ; pki): Uj computes
 = e(H3(Mj); X
xj
i ) for each message of Uj
and lets Digj=gH()+ for verification. Then Uj
transforms Digj to cphj using U 0is public key pki ,
cphj = (g
wj;1 ; gwj;2 ; DigjY
(wj;1+wj;2)
i ), where wj;1;
wj;2  Zp. Finally, Ui runs j  sigSign(sigSk; cphj)to
obtain a signature j on ciphertext cphj . Uj generates
auxiliary information auj = (cphj ; j) for each message of
Uj .
Type-3-3 Test3(Ci; td(3;i;Ci;j); aui; Cj ; td(3;j;i); auj):The
algorithm calculates
Ti =
e(Ci;4; X
xi
j )  e(Yj ; Xxiyij )
e(Cyii;2  Y yij ; Xxi)j
= e(H3(Mi); g1)
xixj
Tj =
e(Cj;4; X
xj
i )
e(Cj;2; X
xjyj)
i
= e(H3(Mi); g1)
xixj
If Ti = Tj holds, return 1 and run
Prove1(H(Ti); H(Tj)) ! proofi for Ui, or return 0
and run Prove2(H(Ti);H(Tj)) ! proofi for Ui otherwise.
(Similarly, the cloud can generate proofj for Uj)
5) Prove:
(1) Prove1(H(Ti);H(Tj))! proofi:
In this case, H(Ti) = H(Tj); rslti = Ci.
–Let P (x) = x and compute gP () by replacing x with
.
–Let M(x) = x and N(x) = H(Tj) + x, and find
two polynomials M 0(x), N 0(x) so as to M(x)M 0(x)+
N(x)N 0(x)=1mod p by satisfying gcd(M(x); N(x)) =
1. Then computing (gM(); gM
0()
1 ; g
N 0())
1 by replacing
x with . Witness=(gM(); gM
0()
1 ; g
N 0()
1 ; g
P ()), set
proofi = (Witness; cphj ; j ; rslti) .
(2)Prove2(H(Ti);H(Tj))! proofi:
In this case, H(Ti) 6= H(Tj), rslti = 
–Let P (x) = x+H(Tj) and calculate gP () by replacing
x with .
–Let M(x) = x + H(Ti) and N(x) = x +
H(Tj), and find two polynomials M 0(x); N 0(x) so
as to M(x)M 0(x) + N(x)N 0(x) = 1 mod p
by utilizing gcd(M(x); N(x)) = 1. Then com-
puting (gM(); gM
0()
1 ; g
N 0()
1 ) by replacing x with
. Witness=(gM(); gM
0()
1 ; g
N 0()
1 ; g
P ()), proofi =
(Witness; cphj ; j ; rslti).
6) V erify(ski; Digi; rslti; proofi):
On inputs rslti and proofi, Ui validates whether
the cloud server has trustily performed the V-PKEET
scheme as follows:
–Validate the completeness of cphj by executing
sigV erify(sigpk; cphj ; j). If the verification is not
passed, then aborts; otherwise continue to execute the
following.
–Decrypt cphj using private key ski according to
Digj = Digjg
yi(tj;1+tj;2)=(gtj;1  gtj;2)yi
–If rslti is empty, let Yi = . Otherwise decrypt rslti
to obtain the message Mi, and compute Yi according to
each type of authorization as follows:
 For Type-1 Authorization: compute
Yi = H(e(H3(Mi); g1));
 For Type-2 Authorization: compute
Yi = H(e(H3(Mi); g
xjxi
1 ));
 For Type-3 Authorization: compute
Yi = H(e(H3(Mi); g
xjxi
1 )).
–Continue to verify the result. If the verification is not
passed, it returns 0; otherwise returns 1.
 If Yi 6= , compute gP
0()
1 according to P
0(x) =
x+ Yi. Otherwise, set P 0(x) = 1 and g
P 0()
1 = g1.
 If e(gM(); gp
0()
1 ) 6= e(Digi; g1), return 0. Other-
wise keep on running the following.
 If e(gp(); gp
0()
1 ) 6= e(Digj ; g1), return 0. Other-
wise keep on running the following.
 If e(gM(); gM
0()
1 )  e(Digj ; gN
0()
1 ) 6= e(g; g1),
return 0. Otherwise return 1.
If it outputs 1, it means that the two users’ ciphertexts are
the same plaintext and the cloud faithfully executes the
protocol. Similarly, Uj can perform the same algorithm
to check if the cloud has devotedly executed the equality
test.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
Theorem 1: Our V-PKEET has OW-CCA security for
Type   ( = 1; 2; 3) authorization against Type   I
adversary under the CDH assumption with the random oracle
model.
Proof: Assume an adversary with advantage " in the game
given in Game 1.
Let A1 is a probabilistic polynomial time Type   I ad-
versary breaking the OW-CCA security. We assume that A1
requests at most qH1H1 hash queries, qH2H2 hash queries,
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qH3H3 hash queries, qK key retrieve queries, qD decryption
queries and qAut authorization queries for Type   ( =
1; 2; 3) authorization. Note that if the same request is made
many times in an oracle query, the same reply will be obtained.
The OW-CCA security is proven by a string of games as
follows.
Game 1.0: We give the game defined in Definition 3 as
follows.
1) pp  fp; e;G;G1; GT ; g; g1; g; g1 ;H;H1;H2;H3g,
81  i  n; xi; yi  Zp ; Xi = gxi1 ; Yi = gyi .
2) state  AoH1 ;oH2 ;oH3 ;oK ;oD;oAut1 (fXi; Yig)ni=1 these
oracles are defined as below.
oH1 query < v1 >: Given a new v1 2 f0; 1g, the
challenger C randomly selects a value h1 uniformly
from the set f0; 1gl and delivers h1 to the adversary
A1.
oH2 query < v2 >: Given a new v2 2 G1, C selects a
random value h2 uniformly from the set f0; 1gl1+l2 and
gives h2 to the adversary A1.
oH3 query < v3 >: Given a new v3 2 GT , C randomly
selects a value h3 uniformly from the field Zp and gives
h3 to the adversary A1.
oK query < i >C gives ski to the adversary A1.
oD query < i;Ci >The challenger inputs ski to execute
the Dec algorithm to decrypt Ci, then returns Mi to A1.
oAut query: The three types of authorization queries
described as follows:
 = 1: given < i >, C inputs ski to execute Aut1
algorithm, then gives td(1;i) = yi to the adversary A1.
 = 2: given < i; j >, C inputs ski to execute Aut2
algorithm, then returns td(2;i;j) = (X
xi
j ; X
xiyi
j ) to the
adversary A1.
 = 3: given < i;Ci; j >, C inputs ski to
execute Aut3 algorithm, then gives td(3;i;Ci;j) =
(Cyii;2Y
yi
j ; X
xi
j ; X
xiyi
j ) to the adversary A1.
3) Mt  G; rt;1; rt;2  Zp ; Ct = (Ct;1; Ct;2; Ct;3;
Ct;4; C

t;5) is defined as follows:
Ct;1 = g
rt;1
1 ; C

t;2 = g
rt;2
Ct;3 = H2(X
rt;1
t ) (Mtjjrt;1)
Ct;4 = Y
rt;2
t H3(Mt)
Ct;5 = H1(C

t;1jjCt;2jjCt;3jjCt;4jjMtjjrt;1)
4) M
0
t  AoH1 ;oH2 ;oH3 ;oK ;oD;oAut1 (state; Ct ). Denoted by
S1;0 the event that Mt = M
0
t in Game 1.0. We have
that
"0 = Adv
OW CCA;Type 
V PKEET;A1 (qH1 ; qH2 ; qH3 ; qK ; qD; qAut)
= Pr[S1;0]( = 1; 2; 3)
(3)
Clearly,
"0 = " (4)
holds.
Game 1.1:
1) pp  fp; e;G;G1; GT ; g; g1; g; g1 ;H;H1;H2;H3g,
81  i  n; xi; yi  Zp ; Xi = gxi1 ; Yi = gyi .
2) state  AoH1 ;oH2 ;oH3 ;oK ;oD;oAut1 (fXi; Yig)ni=1 these
oracles are defined as below.
oH1 query < v1 >: It is identical with that in Game
1.0.
oH2 query < v2 >: It is identical with that in Game
1.0.
oH3 query < v3 >: It is identical with that in Game
1.0.
oK query < i >: It is identical with that in Game 1.0.
oD query < i;Ci >: C executes a request to H2
on input (Cxii;1) and outputs the answer h2. Then the
challenger computes Ci;3  h2 to obtain Mijjri;1 and
tests whether the following equations hold:
Ci;1 = g
ri;1
1 ; Ci;5 = H1(Ci;1jjCi;2jjCi;3jjCi;4jjMijjri;1)
If the test fails, the challenger returns ? to A1; oth-
erwise, it returns Mi to A1. Denoted by E1 event
that in some ciphertexts Ci, there is a new request
Ci;1jjCi;2jj Ci;3jjCi;4jjMijjri;1 to H1 results in Ci;5, in
other words the oracle gives the same reply when the
input is different.
oAut query: It is identical with that in Game 1.0.
3) Mt  G; rt;1; rt;2  Zp ;W 1  f0; 1gl1+l2 ; Ct =
(Ct;1; C

t;2; C

t;3; C

t;4; C

t;5) is defined as follows:
Ct;1 = g
rt;1
1 ; C

t;2 = g
rt;2
Ct;3 = W

1  (Mtjjrt;1)
Ct;4 = Y
rt;2
t H3(Mt)
Ct;5 = H1(C

t;1jjCt;2jjCt;3jjCt;4jjMtjjrt;1)
Add the tuple ((Ct;1)
xi ;W 1 ) to table T2 for H2.
4) M
0
t  AoH1 ;oH2 ;oH3 ;oK ;oD;oAut1 (state; Ct ) Denoted by
S1:1 the event that Mt = M
0
t in Game 1.1. Let
"1 = Pr[S1:1] (5)
Because of the idealness of the random oracle, Pr[E1] is
negligible. Refer to the Difference Lemma in [28], we have
j"1   "0j = Pr[E1] (6)
Game 1.2:
1) pp  fp; e;G;G1; GT ; g; g1; g; g1 ;H;H1;H2;H3g,
81  i  n; xi; yi  Zp ; Xi = gxi1 ; Yi = gyi .
2) state  AoH1 ;oH2 ;oH3 ;oK ;oD;oAut1 (fXi; Yig)ni=1 these
oracles are defined as below.
oH1 query < v1 >: It is identical with that in Game
1.1.
oH2 query < v2 >: It is identical with that in Game
1.1, except that if A1 queries (Ct;1)xi , the game is over.
The event is denoted by E2.
oH3 query < v3 >: It is identical with that in Game
1.1.
oK query < i >: It is identical with that in Game 1.1.
oD query < i;Ci >: It is identical with that in
Game 1.1, unless that getting the challenge ciphertext
Ct (see below), A1 requires to decrypt the ciphertext
(Ct;1; C

t;2; C

t;3; C

t;4; C

t;5), where C
0
t;3 6= Ct;3, C re-
turns ? to the adversary A1.
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oAut query: It is identical with that in Game 1.1.
3) Mt  G; rt;1; rt;2  Zp ;W 2  f0; 1gl1+l2 ; Ct =
(Ct;1; C

t;2; C

t;3; C

t;4; C

t;5) is defined as follows:
Ct;1 = g
rt;1
1 ; C

t;2 = g
rt;2
Ct;3 = W

2 ; C

t;4 = Y
rt;2
t H3(Mt)
Ct;5 = H1(C

t;1jjCt;2jjCt;3jjCt;4jjMtjjrt;1)
Add the tuple ((Ct;1)
xt ;W 2  (Mtjjrt;1)) to table T2
for H2.
4) M
0
t  AoH1 ;oH2 ;oH3 ;oK ;oD;oAut1 (state; Ct ) Denoted by
S1:2 the event that Mt = M
0
t in Game 1.2. Let
"2 = Pr[S1:2] (7)
The game is the same as the distribution in Game 1.1 unless
the event E2 occurs, in other words g
rt;1xt
1 is requested to
the random oracle H2. It is worth noting that the secret key
xt is never acted as the response that the attacker requests.
Consequently, Pr[E2] is negligible under the CDH problem
in G1. From the Difference Lemma in [28], the following
inequality holds
j"2   "1j = Pr[E2] (8)
Because H1 and H3 are viewed as random oracles, the
"2 is negligible. According to the aforementioned analysis,
combining Eqs.(3)-(8), we have
"  Pr[E1] + Pr[E2] + "2 (9)
The equation is negligible under the CDH problem in G1.
The Theorem 1 has been proved completely.
Theorem 2: Our V-PKEET has IND-CCA security for
Type   ( = 1; 2; 3) authorization against Type   II
adversary under CDH assumption and DDH assumption with
the random oracle model.
Proof: Assume an adversary has the advantage " in the
game given in Game 1.
Let A2 is a probabilistic polynomial time Type   II
adversary breaching the IND-CCA security of our scheme.
A2 requests at most qH1H1 hash queries, qH2H2 hash queries,
qH3H3 hash queries, qK key retrieve queries, qD decryption
queries and qAut authorization queries for Type   ( =
1; 2; 3) authorization. Note that if the same request is made
many times in an oracle query, the same reply will be obtained.
The security is proven by a battery of games as follows.
Game 2.0: We give the game that defined in Definition 3
as follows.
1) pp  fp; e;G;G1; GT ; g; g1; g; g1 ;H;H1;H2;H3g,
81  i  n; xi; yi  Zp ; Xi = gxi1 ; Yi = gyi .
2) (M0;M1)  AoH1 ;oH2 ;oH3 ;oK ;oD;oAut2 (fXi; Yig)ni=1
these oracles are issued the same as Game 1.0.
3) b  f0; 1g; rt;1; rt;2  Zp ; Ct = (Ct;1; Ct;2; Ct;3;
Ct;4; C

t;5) is computed as follows:
Ct;1 = g
rt;1
1 ; C

t;2 = g
rt;2
Ct;3 = H2(X
rt;1
t ) (Mbjjrt;1)
Ct;4 = Y
rt;2
t H3(Mb)
Ct;5 = H1(C

t;1jjCt;2jjCt;3jjCt;4jjMbjjrt;1)
4) b0  AoH1 ;oH2 ;oH3 ;oK ;oD;oAut2 (Ct ) We called the event
b = b0 S2;0 in this game. So we have
"0 = Adv
IND CCA;Type 
V PKEET;A2 (qH1 ; qH2 ; qH3 ; qK ; qD; qAut)
= Pr[S2;0]( = 1; 2; 3)
(10)
Clearly,
j"0   1=2j = " (11)
holds.
Game 2.1:
1) pp  fp; e;G;G1; GT ; g; g1; g; g1 ;H;H1;H2;H3g,
81  i  n; xi; yi  Zp ; Xi = gxi1 ; Yi = gyi .
2) (M0;M1)  AoH1 ;oH2 ;oH3 ;oK ;oD;oAut2 (fXi; Yig)ni=1
these oracles are issued the same as Game 1.1.
3) b  f0; 1g; rt;1; rt;2  Zp ;W 1  f0; 1gl1+l2 ; Ct =
(Ct;1; C

t;2; C

t;3; C

t;4; C

t;5) is computed as follows:
Ct;1 = g
rt;1
1 ; C

t;2 = g
rt;2
Ct;3 = W

1  (Mbjjrt;1)
Ct;4 = Y
rt;2
t H3(Mb)
Ct;5 = H1(C

t;1jjCt;2jjCt;3jjCt;4jjMbjjrt;1)
Add the tuple ((Ct;1)
xt ;W 1 ) to table T2 for H2.
4) b0  AoH1 ;oH2 ;oH3 ;oK ;oD;oAut2 (Ct ) We called the event
b = b0 S2;1 in this game. Let
"1 = Pr[S2;1] (12)
Because of the idealness of the random oracle, Pr[E1]
is negligible. Refer to the Difference Lemma in [28], the
following inequality holds
j"1   "0j = Pr[E1] (13)
Game 2.2:
1) pp  fp; e;G;G1; GT ; g; g1; g; g1 ;H;H1;H2;H3g,
81  i  n; xi; yi  Zp ; Xi = gxi1 ; Yi = gyi .
2) (M0;M1)  AoH1 ;oH2 ;oH3 ;oK ;oD;oAut2 (fXi; Yig)ni=1
these oracles are issued the same as Game 1.1.
3) b  f0; 1g; rt;1; rt;2  Zp ;W 2  f0; 1gl1+l2 ; Ct =
(Ct;1; C

t;2; C

t;3; C

t;4; C

t;5) is computed as follows:
Ct;1 = g
rt;1
1 ; C

t;2 = g
rt;2
Ct;3 = W

2 ; C

t;4 = Y
rt;2
t H3(Mb)
Ct;5 = H1(C

t;1jjCt;2jjCt;3jjCt;4jjMbjjrt;1)
Add the tuple ((Ct;1)
xt ;W 2  (Mbjjrt;1)) to table T2
for H2.
4) b0  AoH1 ;oH2 ;oH3 ;oK ;oD;oAut2 (Ct ) We called the event
b = b0 S2;2 in this game. Let
"2 = Pr[S2;2] (14)
The game is the same as the distribution in Game 2.1 except
that the event E2 occurs, in other words g
rt;1xt
1 is requested to
the oracle H2. It is worth noting that the secret key xt is never
acted as the response that the attacker requests. Consequently,
Pr[E2] is negligible under the CDH problem in G1. Refer to
the Difference Lemma in [28], the following inequality holds
j"2   "1j = Pr[E2] (15)
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Game 2.3:
1) pp  fp; e;G;G1; GT ; g; g1; g; g1 ;H;H1;H2;H3g,
81  i  n; xi; yi  Zp ; Xi = gxi1 ; Yi = gyi .
2) (M0;M1)  AoH1 ;oH2 ;oH3 ;oK ;oD;oAut2 (fXi; Yig)ni=1,
these oracles are defined as below.
oH1 query < v1 >: Same as that in Game 2.2 except
that if v1 = (Ct;1jjCt;2jjCt;3jjCt;4jjMbjjrt;1), the game
is over. The event is denoted by E3.
oH2 query < v2 >, oH3 query < v3 >, oK query
< i >, oD query < i;Ci >, oAut query: these queries
are issued identical to Game 2.2.
3) b  f0; 1g; rt;1; rt;2  Zp ;W 3;1  f0; 1gl1+l2 ;
W 3;2  f0; 1gl; Ct = (Ct;1; Ct;2; Ct;3; Ct;4; Ct;5) is
computed as follows:
Ct;1 = g
rt;1
1 ; C

t;2 = g
rt;2 ; Ct;3 = W

3;1;
Ct;4 = Y
rt;2
t H3(Mb); Ct;5 = W 3;2
Add the tuple ((Ct;1)
xt ;W 3;1  (Mbjjrt;1)) to table T2
for H2 and (Ct;1jjCt;2jjCt;3jjCt;4jjMbjjrt;1) to the table
T1 for H1.
4) b0  AoH1 ;oH2 ;oH3 ;oK ;oD;oAut2 (Ct ). We called the event
b = b0 S2;3 in this game. Let
"3 = Pr[S2;3] (16)
The game is the same as the distribution in Game
2.2 only if the event E3 occurs, in other words
(Ct;1jjCt;2jjCt;3jjCt;4jjMbjjrt;1) is requested to the random
oracle H1. We have
j"3   "2j  Pr[E3] (17)
is negligible under the CDH problem in G1.
On referring to the proof of semantic security of ElGamal
scheme [28], we note that it is obvious to validate that "3  
1=2 is negligible under the DDH problem in G. According
to the aforementioned analysis, combining Eqs.(10)-(17), we
have j"0   "3j  Pr[E1 + Pr[E2] + Pr[E3]. The equation
is negligible in the oracle under the CDH problem in G1 and
DDH problem in G. It is worth noting that " = j"0 1=2j and
j"3 1=2j is negligible, so " is negligible. The Theorem 2 has
been proved completely.
VI. COMPARISON
Table I compares the computational complexity between
previous and our PKEET schemes in terms of Type-1 autho-
rization (coarse-grained authorization). We observe that our
design has mildly smaller space in terms of the public key,
the secret key and the ciphertexts than PKEET-FA (Type-1)
[9] and costs a bit less than PKEET-FA(Type-1) in terms of
encryption, decryption and test, noting that we only consider
the equality test rather than the cost of generating the proof
for verification. Moreover, in our authorization, we add the
function of verification for the result from the cloud server.
Table II compares the computational complexity between
previous and our PKEET schemes in the other two autho-
rizations (fine-grained authorizations). Compared with [11],
our Type-2 authorization requires no interactive protocol to
produce the trapdoor td and completes an additional function
TABLE I
COMPARISONS BETWEEN EXISTING WORKS AND OUR SCHEME IN
COARSE-GRAINED AUTHORIZATION
[18] [9](1) Ours(1)
jpkj 2jGj 3jGj 2jGj
jskj 2jZpj 3jZpj 2jZpj
jCj 4jGj+ jZpj+ l0 5jGj+ jZpj 4jGj+ jZpj+ l0
CEnc 5Exp 6Exp 4Exp
CDec 2Exp 5Exp 2Exp
CAut 0 0 0
CTest 4Exp 2Pairing+2Exp 2Exp
Sec/wa OW-CCA OW-CCA OW-CCA
Sec/woa IND-CCA IND-CCA IND-CCA
Gra 1 1 1
verify   X
Legends:jpkj, jskj and jCj: the size of public key, the secret key and the
ciphertext; CEnc, CDec, CAut and CTest: the computational complexity
of algorithms for encryption, decryption, authorization and test; Sec/wa:
authorized security; Sec/woa: unauthorized security; Gra: authorization
granularity with descending grades: 1> 2> 3; Ours()( = 1; 2; 3):
our scheme with Type- authorization; Exp: exponentiation; Pairing:
pairing evaluation.(next table is the same as)
TABLE II
COMPARISONS BETWEEN EXISTING WORKS AND OUR SCHEME IN
FINE-GRAINED AUTHORIZATIONS
[11] Ours(2) Ours(3)
jpkj 2jGj 2jGj 2jGj
jskj 2jZpj 2jZpj 2jZpj
jCj 4jGj+ jZpj+ l0 4jGj+ jZpj+ l0 4jGj+ jZpj+ l0
CEnc 4Exp 4Exp 4Exp
CDec 2Exp 2Exp 2Exp
CAut 3Exp 4Exp 6Exp
CTest 4Pairing 4Pairing 5Pairing
Sec/wa OW-CCA OW-CCA OW-CCA
Sec/woa IND-CCA IND-CCA IND-CCA
Gra 2 2 3
verify  X X
of verification. Type-3 authorization is firstly presented in our
scheme, which could protect the users’ privacy more finely-
grained. Our Type-2 and Type-3 authorizations have very
small computational overheads in the light of Aut algorithm.
Furthermore, the Type-2 and Type-3 authorizations have con-
siderably larger computational overheads over equality tests.
Because they need several bilinear pairing operations and a
bilinear pairing costs about four times longer than an expo-
nentiation in a conventional desktop computer environment
according to the experimental results in [29] [30]. With respect
to the security, same as [9] [11] [18], V-PKEET accomplishes
OW-CCA authorized security and IND-CCA unauthorized
security. Our scheme achieves verification, while the existing
schemes do not take this into account.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this research, we expand the study of PKEET-FA, and
design a verifiable PKEET scheme, called V-PKEET, which,
to the best of our knowledge, is the first PKEET scheme
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providing a verification mechanism to check whether the cloud
server has devotedly executed the equality test. Furthermore,
V-PKEET achieves three types of authorization to protect the
dynamic privacy of data owners. Finally, we prove that our
scheme achieves OW-CCA authorized security and IND-CCA
unauthorized security under the CDH assumption and DDH
assumption in a random oracle model. This proposed scheme
can make the cloud computing in 5G networks more secure.
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